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Introduction 
RECENT TRENDS IN MONETARY POLICY 
by R. Kelleher 
It is generally agreed that since our entry into the European Monetary 
System (EMS) and the establishment of exchange controls the conduct of 
monetary policy has become a more important element of general economic 
policy. In recent times, considerable attention and discussion has been 
devoted to the control of one element of monetary expansion, i.e. bank 
lending to the private sector. On the other hand, there has been much less 
attention to public sector credit creation. 
This paper outlines a framework for monetary policy which links both 
private and public sector credit creation. Recent experience of monetary 
expansion is examined and the role of fiscal policy in facilitating monetary 
stability is outlined. The conclusion is that unless Government borrowing is 
significantly reduced from its current level, excessive monetary creation will 
continue to put pressure on the external reserves and ultimately the 
exchange rate. 
A Framework for Monetary Policy 
The framework suggested here for the formulation of monetary policy 
revolves around a basic identity which is second nature to those familiar 
with U.K. financial markets. The identity is given below: 
1. Money Supply Growth (M3) 
equals 2. Government borrowing requirement less sales of debt to 
the non-bank public 
+ 3. Increase in Bank Loans to Non-Government Sector 
2+3 = Domestic Credit Expansion (D.C.E.) 
± 4. Increase in the combined net foreign assets (liabilities) of 
the Central Bank and the Government 
± 5. Increase in the net foreign assets (liabilities) of the 
commercial banking system 
- 6. Non-Deposit liabilities of the banking system 
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There are two major domestic sources of money supply growth, viz. that 
portion of government borrowing financed by monetary means (i.e. any 
finance other than sales of debt to the non-bank public) and bank lending to 
the private sector. The total of these two major sources of growth (i.e. 2+3) 
is normally defined as Domestic Credit Expansion (D.C.E.). 
The impact of Domestic Credit Expansion on the money supply can 
either be augmented or offset by flows across the foreign exchanges. The 
sum of items 4 and 5 measures the outflows through the balance of payments 
deficit on current account and the net capital outflows (inflows) of the 
private non-bank sector. As the overall balance of payments must be zero, 
these flows are equal but opposite in sign to flows through the commercial 
banks, the Central Bank and the Government. 
Item 4 measures the increase in the level of external reserves minus the 
increase in Government indebtedness abroad. Thus, it measures the change in 
the net foreign position of the public authorities. Item 5 measures the extent 
to which private outflows are financed by increases in the foreign liabilities 
of the banks rather than falls in the level of official reserves. Finally, item 6 
relates mainly to the retained profits of the commercial banks. 
Having outlined the mechanical relationship between the components of 
the money supply, how can we use this framework for formulating monetary 
policy? The starting point is a forecast of the demand for money based on 
forecasts of the growth in nominal incomes and interest rates. The object of 
monetary policy should then be to see that D.C.E. does not exceed this 
forecast growth in money demand. Assuming that the banking system will 
be unwilling to let its net foreign liability position rise continuously and 
given that non-deposit liabilities are small vis-a-vis other magnitudes, it is 
readily seen that domestic credit expansion in excess of the growth in money 
demand is reflected in an increase in the net foreign liability of the public 
sector (i.e. the combined position of the Central Bank and the Government). 
This can take the form of a fall in the level of official reserves or a rise in 
foreign borrowing. It has been a feature of Irish financial comment in recent 
times that there has been much more concern with a fall in public sector 
foreign asset holdings than with a rise in public sector foreign liabilities. 
The advocacy of D.C.E. as a target variable for monetary policy involves 
postulating that the public sector cannot indefinitely run down its foreign 
assets or raise its level of foreign borrowing. Such borrowing would only be 
sustainable in the long term if it was such as to yield a genuine return to the 
exchequer so that its borrowing requirement at some future date would be 
reduced, enabling it to repay its foreign debt and replenish its foreign assets. 
It would be difficult to argue that, in general, the Irish Government's 
borrowing is of this type. Total borrowing in 1979 was in excess of £1,000 
million. The current account deficit accounted for over half of this (in 1979 
it amounted to some 7 per cent of GNP) and some of the capital investment 
is of a social nature that yields very little return to the exchequer. 
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It is true that the country still has a high credit rating internationally and 
can still fund its borrowing requirement abroad without any difficulty 
It should, however, be realised that a good credit rating is something that can 
change fairly dramatically and that unless the fundamental barometers of 
financial prudence such as the balance of payments deficit, the level of the 
borrowing requirement, money supply growth etc. improve, we must expect 
some change in that rating in the future. 
Recent Monetary Experience 
Having identified D.C.E. as the appropriate target variable, it is useful to 
look at recent movements in this variable. Since monetary policy at present 
seems to concentrate on just one part of D.C.E., i.e. bank lending to the 
private sector, figures for the magnitude are not directly available. It is 
possible, however, to collect the figures from a variety of sources on an 
annual basis. Intra-year figures are more difficult, the main deficiency being 
the sales of public sector debt to the non-bank domestic public. The 
experience over the past number of years is summarised in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Domestic Credit Expansion (£m) 
Government Sales of 
Borrowing Securities* 
1976 506 138 
1977 545 135 
1978 810 187 
1979** 1009 200 
*To non-bank domestic public 
**Estimate 
Small Bank Lending to 
Savings Non-Government Sector 
53 391 
102 552 
65 836 
30 850 
D.C.E.*** 
706 
860 
1394 
1629 
***Government Borrowing - Sales of Securities - Small Savings+ Bank Lending= D.C.E. 
Source: Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin - Winter 1979 
Budget 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 
It can be seen that both bank lending to the private sector and Government 
borrowing expanded rapidly over the period, leading to an extremely high 
level of Domestic Credit Expansion in the past two years. It is also evident 
that the ability of the Government to finance its borrowing in a non-monetary 
way has not grown in line with its overall borrowing requirement. 
The same information is presented in a slightly different manner in 
Table 2. 
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TABLE 2: D.C.E. 1975-1979 
Government Contribution Non-Government Contribution 
to D.C.E. to D.C.E. 
As% of As%of 
£m Previous Year's £m Previous Year's 
Money Supply Money Supply 
1976 315 12.9 391 16.0 
1977 308 11.0 552 19.7 
1978 558 17.1 836 25.7 
1979* 779 18.5 850 20.3 
*Estimate 
Source: Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin - Winter 1979 
Budget 1976,1977,1978,1979. 
Total D.C.E. 
As%of 
£m Previous Year's 
Money Supply 
706 28.8 
860 30.7 
1394 42.8 
1629 38.9 
The final column shows D.C.E. as a percentage of the money stock 
outstanding at the end of the previous period, i.e. the contribution of 
domestic monetary creation to the overall growth in money supply. If the 
demand for money expands by less than this figure, then equilibrium is 
restored by a fall in the net foreign assets of the banking system and a rise 
in the net foreign liabilities of the Public Authorities. Columns 2 and 4 break 
down the overall D.C.E. figure as between the Government contribution and 
the private sector contribution-the Government contribution being defined 
as total borrowing less sales of securities to the non-bank domestic public 
and small savings. 
Table 3 shows, in fact, the demand for money has expanded at a much 
more moderate pace than the D.C.E. 
TABLE 3: D.C.E., Money Growth, External Finance 
D.C.E. 
As % of Previous Change in M3 %Growth External 
£m Year's Money (£m) inM3 Finance 
Supply 
1976 706 28.8 350 14.3 -137 
1977 860 30.7 458 16.3 -220 
1978 1394 42.8 935 28.7 -267 
1979 1629 38.9 780 18.6 -756 
In all years the change in the money stock has been less than credit 
expansion with the result that the external finance item has been negative. 
This problem has become particularly severe in the past two years. The 
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external finance item is made up of the increase in the net foreign liabilities 
of the authorities (i.e. foreign borrowing ± change in reserves) and the 
increase in the net foreign liabilities of the commercial banks. Table 4 gives 
the distribution. 
TABLE 4: External Finance (£m) 
Change in Government Net Position** Net External 
Official External Borrowing of Authorities Liability of Total 
Reserves (£m) Abroad (£m) (£m) Banks (£m) (£m) 
1976 +280 324 -44 -93 -137 
1977 +245 200 +45 -265 -220 
1978 +51 323 -272 +5 -267 
1979* -277 459 --736 -20 -756 
*Estimate 
**Change in External Reserves minus Government Borrowing Abroad. 
Column 3 shows that in the past two years the surge in Government 
borrowing combined with a rapid expansion of bank lending has resulted 
in the net foreign position of the authorities worsening by more than £1,000 
million. 
There seems little doubt that a combination of this trend is not 
consistent with the exchange rate commitment of the European Monetary 
System. At some stage, our ability to borrow abroad would diminish and real 
pressure would then emerge on the level of external reserves, forcing a 
devaluation of the currency. 
The Appropriate Level of Public Borrowing 
Corrective action requires policy measures which will reduce the growth 
in credit expansion (as measured by our D.C.E. variable) to a level in line 
with the likely growth in money demand. The current credit policy of the 
Central Bank will reduce the contribution of the private sector to D.C.E. 
well below the levels of recent years. However, public sector credit creation 
is still extremely high. This raises the question of the appropriate level of 
borrowing which is consistent with monetary stability. 
One way of approaching the question is to reorganise the money stock 
equation into two sides of a balance sheet and interpret one side as the 
supply of funds and the other as the demand for funds. This is done in 
Table 5, where the figures for the period of 1976-1979 are given. 
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TABLE 5: Supply and Demand for Funds 1976-1979 (£m) 
Supply of Funds: 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Money Supply Growth 350 458 935 780 
Sales of Debt to Non-Bank 
Public 191 237 252 230 
External Finance 137 220 267 756 
Non-Deposit Liabilities 219 182 192 93 
Total: 897 1097 1646 1859 
Demand For Funds: 
Bank Lending to Non-
Government Sector 391 552 836 850 
Government Borrowing 506 545 810 1009 
Total: 897 1097 1646 1859 
Table 6 looks at the figures for 1980 and examines the policy implica-
tions of setting a target level of zero for the external finance item. 
TABLE 6: Supply and Demand for Funds-· 1980 (£m) 
Supply of Funds 
Money Supply Growth 
Sales of Debt. to non-
bank public 
External Finance 
900 
300 
Non-Deposit Liabilities 150 
Total: 1350 
Demand for Funds 
Bank Lending 
Govt. Borrowing 
640 
710 
1350 
On the basis of expected growth in nominal GNP in the Irish economy in 
1980, the demand for money is projected to grow by 18 per cent. Given an 
institutional cash flow of between £250 million and £300 million, purchases 
of Government Securities and small savings by the non-bank public should 
amount to some £300 million. 
The external finance target has been. set at zero. This is based on the 
belief that given the deterioration in the net foreign position of the 
authorities in the last two years, it would be prudent to curtail any further 
worsening of the position in the interests of a stable exchange rate. In fact, 
one could argue that Government external debt is now so much larger than 
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external reserves that external finance should be a negative source of finance 
and allow some decline in the net foreign liability of the authorities. 
Adding on £150 million for non-deposit liabilities gives a total supply of 
funds of £1,350 million to finance the Government borrowing requirement 
and bank lending to the private sector. The figure of £640 million for bank 
lending assumes the Central Bank guideline will be reduced from 18% per 
annum to 15%. The Government borrowing requirement, thus, comes out as 
a residual of £710 million. It should be stressed that Table 5 is not a 
forecast. Rather it is an illustration of the level of the borrowing requirement 
consistent with a total credit expansion which would leave the net foreign 
liability position of the authorities unchanged and which would not unduly 
squeeze the non-Government sector. 
At present it seems unlikely that borrowing will be held down to a level 
of £710 million. What happens if borrowing remains at about £1,000 million 
in 1980? Any of the following three scenarios is possible. 
Firstly, bank lending could be correspondingly reduced so that the 
overall level of credit creation would remain unchanged. If borrowing were 
raised to £1,000 million, bank lending would be reduced to £350 million or 
a growth rate of 8 per cent for the year. This would be a classic example of 
the private sector being 'crowded out' by an expansionary fiscal policy in 
combination with an unchanged monetary policy. 
If the demand for credit significantly exceeded this 8 per cent growth, it 
could result in significant effects on output and demand. This is because 
domestic borrowers would not be prepared to augment domestic borrowing 
with overseas loans because of the currency risk. Current regulations prevent 
the covering of this risk in the forward exchange market--transactions in 
this market being limited to trade-related transactions. The reasons for this 
particular regulation are not obvious as the freeing of this market would 
substantially reduce the deflationary impact of restrictive monetary policy. 
Secondly, the authorities could try to finance the increased borrowing 
by increased sales of debt to the non-bank public. This, however, would be 
a particularly difficult task as the major operators in the gilt-edge market are 
the pension funds and life assurance companies in conjunction with the 
building societies. The cash flow of these institutions is, to a large extent, 
fixed in the short-run due to the contractual nature of the majority of their 
inflows. Therefore, sales of debt on the scale required to finance the extra 
borrowing would be unlikely without dramatic movements in yield levels. 
Thirdly, the borrowing could be financed in a monetary way (i.e. from 
the banking system, the Central Bank or from abroad). This ultimately 
would lead to an equivalent deterioration in the net foreign position of the 
authorities. In terms of Table 6, this would be the same as further funding 
under the heading External Finance. The implication of such a course of 
action would be to lower the level of external reserves and/ or to increase 
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foreign borrowing, ultimately putting pressure on our ability to maintain a 
stable exchange rate. 
It should be pointed out that the monetary 'model' underlying the above 
calculations is recursive in nature. The level of nominal GNP and interest 
rates are wholly determined outside the monetary sector and feed into a 
demand for money function to determine the level of the money stock 
outstanding. This 'model' was particularly appropriate under our previous 
fixed exchange rate relationship with sterling. However, under our present 
regime where the exchange rate can vary, in short-run, by moving up and 
down the EMS bands and in the medium term by central parity changes 
within the system, it would seem more appropriate that interest rates, at 
least, would be endogenous to the monetary sector. This does not invalidate 
the underlying approach of this paper. In technical terms, all that would be 
required is a simultaneous solution of an economy-wide model incorporating 
a monetary sector rather than the recursive solution method outlined above. 
Conclusion 
This paper has set out to examine broad trends in monetary policy in 
recent years. It has concentrated on a measure of monetary expansion 
(D.C.E.) which takes account both of private and public sector credit 
creation. The figures show an excessive growth in credit creation which has 
become particularly pronounced in the past two years. This has resulted in a 
large increase in the combined net foreign liability of the Government and 
the Central Bank. 
A continued deterioration in this net foreign position is not consistent 
with a stable exchange rate within the EMS. If exchange rate stability is to 
be maintained there is a need for policy actions which will reduce overall 
credit expansion in line with the growth in the demand for money. The 
Central Bank has already taken action which will ensure that one component 
of credit creation, viz. bank lending to the non-Government sector will 
grow at a more moderate pace than has been the case in recent years. 
However, it is equally important to contain the level of monetary financing 
of the Government borrowing requirement. Unless this borrowing is reduced 
significantly, excessive monetary growth seems likely to continue if the 
private sector is not to be totally 'squeezed out: and this would give rise 
to doubts about our ability to maintain our position within the EMS. 
At present, there are no official statistics directly available on total 
Domestic Credit Expansion. It would seem appropriate in our new monetary 
environment that such statistics be published on a monthly basis by the 
Central Bank. 
32 
